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Bottome: Wills--Testamentary Intent

STUDENT NOTES
sion was never notified of the assignment to the surety company
and for the further reason that he had a superior equity, since
he had loaned to the contractors in order that they might pay off
laborers. The court did not pass upon the priorities between
Riley and the surety company, but rested the case upon the priority
of the materialmen with respect to Riley, although their assignments
were subsequent to Riley's. The case seems to turn on the peculiarities of the particular situation, and the policy in favor of protecting materialmen. The fact that Riley's money was used to
pay laborers seems to have been neglected, and he was treated as
an ordinary general creditor. It seems that the court took the view
that something in the nature of an equitable lien on the claim
against the Commission arose by operation of law in favor of the
materialmen prior to any assignment to them and this gave them
priority over the assignee, Riley. It would seem that this case
does not weaken the general rule favoring the prior assignee.
In view of these facts, it .would seem that, until further adjudication upon the point, the West Virginia rule can be understood
to be in accord with the minority view.
-SMNEY J. KWASS.

WLs-TESTAmENTARY

INTENT.-Proceedings to probate as the

will of T, a letter to his brother written and signed by T. The
letter was to the effect, "If I should fail to pull through this
operation I want you to sell the Columbia Carbon Stock * * * *
and divide the proceeds equally among my brothers and sisters
* * * *". T died two days after the operation. The Circuit
Court found this to be T's will and ordered it probated. Objected
that the letter did not show Animus testandi. Held, animus
testandi is the purpose to direct the posthumous disposition of
property. It is not essential to this purpose that the testator
should intend to make a will or know that he has performed a
testamentary act. The letter written by T showed this intent.
Langfitt v. Langfitt, 151 S. E. 715 (W. Va. 1930).
A holographic will is good under our statute, ch. 77, 33. It is
not necessary that the decedent should know that he has performed
a testamentary act, nor that he should intend to perform such
an act. Rice v. Freeland, 131 Va. 298, 109 S. B. 186. No particular words are necessary to show testamentary intent. In re
Major's Estate, 264 Pac. 542. One may act anino testandi
without knowing that he is making a will, if he manifests clear
intent to dispose of his property after his decease and observes
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statutory formalities. Merril v. Boal, 47 R. I. 274i 132 Atl. 721, 45
A. L. R. 830; In re Bybee's Estate, 179 Ia. 1089, 160 N. W.
900; Earle v. Arnold, 119 Va. 500, 89 S. E. 900; Rice v. Freeland,
supra; Milan v. Stanley, 33 Ky. L. R. 783, 111 S. W. 296; Arendt
v. Arendt, 80 Ark. 204, 96 S. W. 982; Cowley v. Knapp, 42 N. J.
L. 297, Buffington v. Thomas, 84 Miss. 157, 36 So. 1039;
Byers v. Hoppe, 61 Md. 206, 48 Am. Rep. 89; Alston v.
Davis, 118 N. C. 202, 24 S. E. 15; In re Estate of Kimmel,
123 Atl. 405. The case of Rice v. Freeland, supra, was
substantially the same as to facts as the case under discussion.
In that case letters written in France in direct contemplation of
the fact that the writer might not survive the war, containing a
definite expression of the disposition, which in that event he
desired to have made of whatever property he might leave behind, were construed as a valid will, notwithstanding that the
testator in all probability did not think he was writing a will.
In the ease of Thompson v. Randall, 150 S. E. 249 (Va. 1929),
an attempt was made to probate two letters as a will, both letters
having been written by the alleged testator to his daughter and
granddaughter, and each letter containing language to the effect
that they were to have his house and lot when he died. One
letter was written eight years before his death and the other, two
years before his death. The Virginia court refused to probate
these two letters as a will, saying, "that the letters which the
plaintiffs seek to have probated do not show the testamentary
intention with sufficient clearness, at the time the letters were
written, to dispose of the property by the letters themselves." It
would seem that the nearer to the impending death such letters
are written the better chance they have of surviving as valid wills,
when offered for probate. The result of Langfitt v. Langfitt, supra,
is justifiable under our statute, ch. 77, §3, and the case follows
what seems to be a decided weight of authority.

-PAuL

AUTOmOBiLE

ACCIDENT INsURANCE-JUDICIAL

E

. Bo om.

DEFINIION

OF

TEFm "ACcmENT".-A deputy sheriff was escorting a prisoner to
jail in an open car, and was driving along at a speed of from
twenty-five to thirty-five miles an hour, when the latter jumped out.
The deputy, abandoning the wheel, jumped out after him to
prevent his escape and was thrown to the ground, receiving fatal
injuries. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in a
recent case denied the beneficiary a recovery under his accident
instrance policy, holding that he was not "accidently thrown"
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